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The Old Boy Networks
Lieutenant-General William A.B. Anderson
Interview, Ottawa 21 May 1991

J. L. G R A N A T S T E I N

Abstract: W illiam A n d erso n was a P erm a n en t F o rce artillerym an who
held sta ff appointm ents in the overseas army through m uch of the Second
World War. T his tra nscrip t of an interview conducted by J.L . G ran atstein
in 1991 fea tures A n d e r so n ’s thoughtful and “n o n -ju d g m en ta l” insights
concerning many sen io r officers, including G enerals H .D .G . C rera r and
G .G . Sim onds, both of whom he served during the cam paign in N orth 
West E urope.
R esu m e : W illiam A n d erson, un ancien a rtilleu r de la fo rce p erm an ente,
a occupe des em plois d ’o fficiers superieurs dans l ’arm ee d ’outre-m er
durant la m ajeure p artie de la D eu x iem e G uerre m ondiale. C ette
tra n scrip tion d ’une entrevue m enee par J.L . G ran a tstein en 1991
p resen te les reflexio n s exem ptes de ju g em en t de M. A n d erson concerna nt
bon nom bre d ’o fficiers superieurs, dont les generaux H .D .G . C rera r et
G .G . Sim onds, qui ont serv i durant la cam pagne dans le n ord -ou est de
l ’E urope.

G e n e r a l A n d erson at his home in Ottawa as
part of the research for my book The Generals: The Canadian
Arm y’s Senior Commanders in the Second, World, War, published
in 1993. I knew him slightly because he had been the commandant at
the Royal Military College in 1960-1961, my last year there.
Anderson’s interview was, I thought then and still, superb for
its clear assessments and its frank, non-judgmental tone. He was
particularly good in assessing Guy Simonds and Harry Crerar, the
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two key commanders he watched in action and served as a staff
officer. Anderson was a fine officer, but he recognized that his rise
during the war had been attributable to those he knew as much as
what he knew. Still, his talents as a staff officer were such that he
never had the opportunity to command in the field which must have
bothered him.
After V E Day, Anderson went back to Canada to serve in the
Pacific Force as Deputy Commander Royal Artillery, but Japan
surrendered before the troops could be deployed. Promoted Colonel in
1946 - age 31 - he served in Canada, commanded the brigade in nato
and was Commandant of rmc as a brigadier, served as AdjutantGeneral, and in 1966, promoted to Lieutenant-General, he led Mobile
Command. Anderson retired from the Canadian Forces in 1969,
joined the Ontario public service at a senior level, and died in 2000.
This interview has been lightly edited. The original is in my
papers at the York University Archives and a copy of the interview,
along with all those I did for the book, is held at the Directorate of
History and Heritage at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa.

We began with Guy Simonds. He took command of a field regiment
in 1940, after the unit (Ham Roberts’) had returned from France
only with its guns (all other equipment left behind) and with its
morale bruised. Those who’d been envious of Simonds had said he
was a staff man and couldn’t command, but he got the regiment in
shape, gave it a great electric jolt. He used traditional methods (inter
battery competitions, etc.), but it worked.
Anderson had first met him during his rmc 3rd year summer
training (1935) when he was at Petawawa as a Temporary 2nd
Lieutenant, assigned to Capt. Simonds as a gunnery instructor.
Simonds was just back from the Gunnery Staff Course in the U.K.
Anderson spent the summer carrying papers and making notes for
him, his bumboy in effect. He learned more about how to teach
watching him. He wasn’t intolerant of the militia, but was patient
and didn’t frighten them. He was a dandy, but so articulate. And
he was good to Anderson and didn’t scare the pants off him. He
never had qualms about chatting with Simonds, and Simonds was
pleased that Battalion Sergeant-Major [the top cadet position at rmc ]
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W illia m A . B. A n d erso n as a lieutenantcolon el, the ran k he h eld in 1943 to 1946.

[Directorate of History andHeritage]

Anderson chose the artillery. Anderson said Simonds wasn’t nice to
him just because his father was a general. And if they met at the
Park Lane in London during the war, they’d go to a show together.
In 1938, just back from Camberley, Simonds was posted to rm c .
He was “super snap”, he’d been singled out, and everyone knew it.
Indeed when Anderson joined A Battery, rcha at Kingston, all the
wos and ncos and even some gunners remembered Simonds from the
1920s. They sang his praises, called him the Count, and thought he
was a good horseman, a good regimental officer. They respected his
ability and professionalism. By the time the war came, Anderson had
great admiration for him.
Moreover, Simonds was a good technical gunner. He could teach
all aspects of gunnery, though it was true he never handled guns in
action. He didn’t study gunnery, Anderson said, because he didn’t
need to; nor did he sit around the mess wasting time.
We then switched to more general subjects. The time for
promotion from Lieutenant to Captain in the Permanent Force was
8 years - but you could pass the exams sooner - Anderson did after
2 years. The pf was very unprofessional, play soldiering, full of old
officers (but also some 1920s and 1930s duds). But Harry Crerar
wasn’t like that - he was thoroughly professional, oriented to the
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future, and very experienced. E.W. Sansom too had a good mind and
was a real student of his profession; however, he was a bit too much of
a partyer to survive the whole course. E.L.M . Burns too was serious,
very bright, dedicated.
Others were less good. Ham Roberts, who Anderson had real
affection for, was his battery commander. He’d married money, didn’t
hang around the mess, and the men adored him because he could
sing “Old Man River” better than Paul Robeson. He was the idol of
battery smokers. His battery won the inter-battery competitions and
he was no weak link. But he didn’t over-exert himself, didn’t get to
Staff College, and didn’t do Gunnery Staff Courses in the U.K.
George Pearkes he knew from pre-RM C days, and Pearkes called
him “Billy” from the age of 13. As g s o 1 at r m c , Pearkes was a bit
away from cadets and ran the militia staff course, promotion exams,
staff college entrance exams, etc. He next saw him when he was doing
the practical portion of the Lieutenant-Captain exams at Petawawa
when Pearkes came out from Ottawa to watch the syndicates. At the
end he gave a splendid pep talk off the cuff on what young officers
should do when the shooting started. There was nothing innovative in
what he said, but he said all the right things. When he saw Pearkes
next he had 1st Division and Anderson was on some job that took
him to his h q . Pearkes had organized a volleyball game on the lawn
and he dragged “Billy” in - a nice easy touch. He then saw little of
him until 1960 when Pearkes as Defence minister named him to be
r m c commandant.
The r m c old boy net never crossed Anderson’s mind and he
doesn’t believe in it. Simonds certainly didn’t play it, nor Crerar. For
every ex-cadet like J.V. Young who was brought in at the top, there
must have been five non-R M C ers. Still, though he had no control over
who was posted to his regiment, he was happy if he got ex-cadets.
What did r m c then do? Prewar it had provided the skills that had
helped mobilize the militia. For example, the Princess of Wales Own
Rifles in Kingston was commanded by Anderson’s father-in-law and
had Ben Cunningham as its Adjutant. He was an ex-cadet, a lawyer,
and likely the only ex-cadet in the regiment. When the p w o r were
mobilized, the adjutant was critical; if they were posted somewhere,
the Adjutant would do a reconnaissance and see who he knew,
using the r m c link or his legal links. This is networking and proper,
knowing each other and having instant mutual respect. (Anderson
noted that Simonds fired Cunningham as a brigadier in Normandy.
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Simonds told Crerar he was doing this and, although Crerar might
have stopped this at cost of a war with Simonds, he didn’t; he did
interview Cunningham whom he had known in Kingston. Crerar
fixed it for him to become rmc Commandant.)
Keller: he doubted that Simonds would have admired him. But
why did he not fire him in Normandy? First, he was on the hot seat
in his biggest battle. He had to satisfy General Montgomery he could
run II Canadian Corps and the brass got twitchy if an advance was
held up. The relationship between Simonds and Montgomery was
still too green for him to feel confident about firing a division g o c .
Perhaps, Anderson suggested, the pf old boy net was more powerful
than the rmc net- thus it might have been easier to fire George
Kitching or Cunningham than Keller.
The militia/PF tension, he said, was very real. There was little
mutual respect in 1939 though this diffused over six years of war.
The pf culture was pretty strong, and some like Stanley Todd
[Commander Royal Artillery, 3rd Division]were aware they’d got
where they did without pf help. Also there was a gunners’ network,
and there was no rivalry in the artillery over different badges (as in
infantry). Still, he remembered the unpleasantness of hearing people
talk in the Petawawa mess about “goddamn P F know it alls.”
W hy did some rise? The recipe for not rising was to do a poor
job. Those who “completed staff action” and left no loose ends and
were dependable rose. Remember, the army overseas grew out of all
recognition in 2-1/2 years and hands on control from the top was
impossible. What you knew was the key but who you knew also had
a lot to do with it. Anderson cited his own case: he was Adjutant
of a militia artillery regiment in lst Division and the Commander
Royal Artillery was J.C. Stewart. Anderson had good reports and
his Commanding Officer liked him, so when a captain was needed at
Division hq , Stewart picked him. Then he was picked for Camberley
War Staff Course (at the same time as Ted Beament).
General Price Montague and Canadian Military Headquarters:
Anderson served there 3 times. He worked for Maurice Pope on
General McNaughton’s main submission to Ottawa on creation of
the Army (and they completely forgot to include a tank brigade!).
He didn’t deal with Montague on this important question at all.
A militia officer, Montague had Defence Minister J.L. Ralston’s
confidence that he wasn’t in the p f ’s pocket; and if the head of cmhq
could possibly not be in McNaughton’s pocket, then Montague was
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the man. Montague roamed the halls like a cricket, calling people
“boy” in a cheery way. He’d poke his head into offices.
Harry Crerar as acting Corps commander and Senior Combatant
Officer had a tiny staff - 1 staff officer and 2 clerks, and Anderson
was the officer to the sco . Crerar was conscious of the fact Montague
was junior to him, but he was also aware of the need not to bypass or
short-circuit him. So if he got an “eyes only” message from Ralston
or the Chief of the General Staff in Ottawa, he’d go out of his way to
discuss it with Montague. Crerar was very savvy - he knew Ralston
would talk a lot with Montague whenever he came to the U.K. and
he didn’t want Montague to criticize him.
Anderson only knew Crerar to say hello pre-war. But in 1939
40, Crerar was around Aldershot a lot and his daughter and her
husband shared billets with Anderson and his wife. Crerar replaced
Anderson’s uncle as cgs (Major-General T.V. Anderson), and he was
a good choice. He’d served at the War Office, at rmc , he’d set up
cmhq , etc. Then to everyone’s great surprise, he ceased to be cgs and
took command of 2nd Division briefly and then the Corps. Anderson
was his first Personal Assistant. Crerar had never had battledress on,
and Anderson could never see him in a field command role. He saw
him each day with the wireless traffic from Ottawa, and here Crerar
was at home.
McNaughton, on the other hand, had an aura about him, a
flamboyance without trying for it, and a great press build-up. He’d
come into any group and liven it up; he was “bright as all Hell”. In
France in 1940, where he’d have been division g o c , there were no
concerns about him. There were no brooding feelings about him until
1942-3 and the British were first to worry. The exercises put him in
difficulty, as they had for Generals Sansom and F.F. Worthington.
And there was the feeling that all Great War people were has-beens.
Crerar as Arm y commander: Army was not a battlefield fighting
organization in Northwest Europe. Division goc s were apt to carry
brigadiers with them while playing with battalions; so too did Monty,
without insulting Crerar or General Miles Dempsey, carry corps along.
Defeating the enemy was a corps/division/Monty job. What role then
did Crerar’s Arm y hq have? 1. It coordinated air support for its corps.
Simonds or Charles Foulkes told Crerar what they needed, use of air
was worked with 84 [Group, Second] Tactical Air Force (whose hq
was co-located with Army hq). 2. It handled logistics. The corps and
divisions were supposed to be fast and flexible, and the vast tonnages
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needed depended on trucks controlled by Army. In effect Crerar had
a staff officer role as Army commander. He drove around and visited,
showed the flag, and didn’t attempt to influence the battle. Certainly
he wouldn’t second guess Simonds (who was inclined to be critical of
the way Crerar ran Army). Crerar realized his lack of influence, his
Orders Groups were infrequent. If Monty wanted something, Crerar
would get hold of Churchill Mann, the Chief of Staff, Ted Beament,
the Brigadier, General Staff, and Anderson, the g s o i , his key staff
officers, and then Anderson would send a quick signal to the corps to
re-jiggle. At a company level things happened fast; at division less so;
at corps slowly; at army glacially.
When a big show was on, like the Scheldt, supplies poured in
and the heat was on. Monty would call an Orders Group. At Army,
there’d be feverish staff activity by Mann and A.E. Walford, the
Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General, putting the Arm y plan
together, and even here Crerar hung back, confident the staff would
do the job.
Walcheren was different. Simonds had a bee in his bonnet on
how to bomb the dykes so as to create new beaches on which to land.
He kept pleading his case, but Arm y didn’t believe in it, thinking
it too clever by half. But when Crerar got ill (this came as a bolt
from the blue for the staff) and Simonds took over as acting Army
commander, he galvanized the staff. Mann was nervous as a cricket
- he’d never worked for someone like Simonds before. Beament was
as usual imperturbable. Simonds said he’d bomb and it was his job
to get the r af through the top brass channels. He did and it worked.
Unfortunately, the weather didn’t cooperate and the attack was
delayed while tension built. Finally, Simonds, after agonizing, sent in
the assault. This was an Army battle with Simonds in charge - but
this was because it was tri-service. Still, things were clear whereas
before they didn’t have to be. Simonds was a commander in the
classic mould - he made the plan, the staff had to make it work,
and his job was to see that what he wanted was done. When Crerar
returned, things also returned to normal.
The Reichswald was First Canadian Arm y’s golden moment
with a huge force under control. But what did Army contribute? It
was Monty’s operation - he got U.S. troops, he made the plan, and
Arm y’s job was just detailed staff work. If Simonds had been there
things would have been different: Monty might have given him more
independence.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2014

7

Canadian Military History, Vol. 23 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 7

Nonetheless, Crerar was the right man for the job. He spoke for
Canada very effectively even if he wasn’t the best field commander.
He had a strong sense of the proper relationship to the British Army
and his Great War experience told him how important it was for
Canadians to stay together and be distinctively Canadian. And he
was smoother than McNaughton, more civilized in achieving this.
Every time he had a problem, one part of his mind asked, “how will
this look in the history books?” He was also very conscious of his
Senior Combatant Officer hat.
For all his Britishness, however, Simonds was also a nationalist,
and it wouldn’t have been much different with him. He would have
worked well with Monty, but he’d have had little time for politics.
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